Article

Historians of Modern Times: A Case Study of La'o Hamutuk for Hybridity as Instrumental in Post-Conflict Development

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Abstract: This paper has been edited from a practicum report fulfilling the requirements of a master's degree in Peace and Conflict Studies from Otago University (2019). The internship taken for this report was accomplished at La'o Hamutuk, a non-profit institute for development, monitoring and analysis located in Dili, Timor-Leste. The author utilizes critical perspectives of liberal peacebuilding and reflexive methodologies to assess how hybrid mechanisms of international development are and are not being used at the organizational level and assesses how the moral superiority of the liberal ethic in development schemes potentially hinders individual organizations such as La'o Hamutuk at the local level.

Keywords: hybridity, Timor-Leste, liberal peacebuilding, international development, civil society

Introduction

My leading research question for this paper is "Does La'o Hamutuk and its work encounter the same debates and dilemmas as Liberal Peacebuilding measures within and beyond Timor-Leste? If so, what are the compromises made which prevent both the macro (general initiatives lead under liberal peacebuilding sponsorship) and the micro (activities and investments made by La'o Hamutuk) from achieving their sought objectives?" To provide an appropriate purview for answering this question this paper has identified hybrid methods which have been more generally adapted into liberal peacebuilding standards, along with specific mechanisms utilized by La'o Hamutuk as a development NGO.[1] This report provides new knowledge into the field of PACS while also serving as a reflection of my experience as inherently political, allowing questions of "who claims to know, and how, and the power relationship produced by this" to inform the writing process (Gillies & Alldred, 2012, p.43).[2]

Increasingly since the 1990's, a growing number of PACS scholars have theorized and critiqued the measures of international peacekeeping, democratization, and development interventions to countries in intrastate conflict or just coming out of such conflict (Alpaslan, Ozerdem & Lee, 2015; Chandler, 2004; Dzuverovic, 2018; Paris, 1997, 2010; Roberts, 2012). While many academics, activists, pracademics, and even journalists contend that it is the eventual outcome of western colonization which has undergirded many conflicts of the last two decades, very few argue that there should be no international involvement to ensure human rights and stabilization after conflict or occupation ensues.

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[1] For a comprehensive assessment of both hybridity in theory and in practice see Uesegi & Pusca (2020) *Hybrid Peacebuilding in Asia.*

[2] This paper has been adapted from a MPACS Final Thesis Report, completing the final portion of PEAC 595 Practicum Report where the master's student is required to complete an internship with an organization and/or grassroots movement of their choice which works in the fields of peacebuilding, development, mediation, humanitarian relief, etc. My internship was completed with La'o Hamutuk (in the local language of Tetum translates to 'Walk Together'), the Institute for Development, Monitoring and Analysis located in Dili, Timor-Leste, where I joined the organization as a research intern within the Human Rights and Governance Research Team from October 26th, 2018-January 25th, 2019.

Observers, and most importantly victims to conflict,[3] have just cause to critique international interventions which claim to be imperative for peace at a global scale even while states in war and conflict are increasingly becoming customary. According to the UN-CPR Overview of Global and Regional Trends Report (1990-2013), there were 33 active intrastate armed conflicts worldwide and according for the Fund for Peace's most recent Fragile State Index (2019) only 18 out of 178 countries were measured as stable or in a state of sustained peace.

These statistics could demonstrate the need for increased participation in democratization and development work in the still developing and post-conflict states or could just as easily illustrate inherent ontological aberrations by intervening 'developed' nations when it comes to gaging roots of conflict. There is still no proof on either of these conjectures, however there is very little literature found which does not promote some third party and/or international body involvement to either prevent or cease mass violence at both national and regional levels.

For the purposes of this report Liberal Peacebuilding is not constrained to measures orchestrated by leading International Agencies such as the UN, World Bank, IMF, WHO, etc. but also extends to local and international developmental NGO's, civil society objectives and programs, and can also include initiatives out of local governments. When referring to Human Rights, I am referring to the conceptual understanding of human rights, with an ontological origin in enlightenment thinking and Post WWII initiatives which composed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The use of human rights here, as well as its general use from other staff members of La'o Hamutuk is as a signaling device to establish international legitimacy to a claim regarding social issues, protections, and welfare. When using the word 'development' in this report I am generally referencing the actions involved in the UN 17 Sustainable Development Goals, as this was a common reference for my NGO in their research outputs as well as the type of work (whether directly linked to the UN or not) most referenced by the literature in this report. Though there are the parameters of these frequently used terms/subject area during my studies and more importantly during my internship with La'o Hamutuk, I attempted in this report to interpret how these generally accepted terms made meaningful interactions with people's day to day lives.

The first chapter will give a brief history and review of putative definitions, critiques, and advances of LPB. Historically, some comparisons will be drawn to further illustrate how definitions have changed as a side-effect of certain conflicts or been adapted individually by different contexts and cultures. How civil society became legitimated pre-independence and post-independence will be introduced to better understand how La'o Hamutuk as an organization within civil society became an entrusted resource both nationally and internationally within the last 18 years since it has been operational.

In Chapter Two the history, mission/vision, and structure of La'o Hamutuk will be detailed. Here I will establish what I observed as LH's theory of change, and where the impact is made, challenged and perhaps limited. The specificity of my own tasks and contract as a human rights and governance researcher within the organization has been withdrawn to better accommodate the guidelines for the NPACS working paper series. In Chapter Three I will synthesize Chapters One and Two to compare the key perplexities which I see as inhibiting LPB initiatives in various post-conflict cases and how this effects La'o Hamutuk in both the short and long-term scheme of achieving their objectives for citizens of a newly formed semi-presidential democratic government. From Chapter One I will utilize theoretical and practical gaps presented in LPB literature to assess my final internship outcomes and reflections, providing the groundwork for the 'limits of liberalism' for the work of La'o Hamutuk and how the organization could be a positive case study for hybrid development for further research. It will also reflect more personally on how the internship impacted my own practice and praxis within academia.

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[3] Conflict for the purposes of this report being defined as more than 1,000 deaths from battle between a recognized state and one or more organized armed groups or another recognized state by the UN University Centre for Policy Research (UN-CPR) and International Humanitarian Law (IHL)

The Conclusion Chapter will summarize what was accomplished in this report, spaces for extension, and my personal aspirations of how to be in relationship with the organization La'o Hamutuk in the future. There will also be recommendations for La'o Hamutuk and other local organizations in developing post-conflict settings on how to engage with false and viable hybrid solutions within the development sector along with the potential long-term risks of not integrating democratic structures into the internal structure and external activities of the organization.

Chapter One: Theoretical and Country Context

1.1 Liberal Peacebuilding: History and Evolving Definitions

The founding of the United Nations Charter in 1945 is one of the most consequential historical markers for the literature on international peacebuilding. Principles of the United Nations, its affiliated agencies and henceforth the priorities of post-conflict peacebuilding and peacekeeping missions in war-affected countries have been of a liberal ethic. The demonstrations of this ethic have been played out in ambitious attempts of international interventions in regions of Eastern Europe, Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and South America (Call & Cooke, 2003; Dzuverovic, 2018; MacGinty, 2015; Joshi, Lee, & MacGinty, 2014; Richmond, 2006). While contentions still exist for an overarching singular definition of what in fact is 'Liberal Peacebuilding,' its general themes, proclivity towards hegemonic structures and historical trends over the last two decades are what is most prevalent in the literature.

Joshi, Lee and MacGinty (2014) in an analysis on Peace Accords summarized six overarching themes to liberalism: the recognition of the individual as a sovereign actor; an emphasis on tolerance, diversity, and equal opportunity; the pursuit of freedom; optimism in people's ability to reform themselves and institutions; rationality of individuals and collectives; and the importance of individual property and law. From these themes, the authors developed themes of liberal rhetoric which are consistently seen in seminal peace-related documents, in other words what is used routinely in peace policy to establish state transitions and interventions. These policy related themes include promotion of democracy, the rule of law, emphasis on human rights, security sector reform and governance reform. A difficult stance within contributing critically to LPB studies is, as Paris (2010) notes, many critiques of the tactics and logic behind LPB in practice is often a critique of it not living up to liberal standards proposed, rather than providing alternatives. In other words, critiques of liberal intervention often carry an inherent theoretically liberal logic.

Sustaining peace can be an even more intricate and involved process than stabilizing conflict at an entry level point. Much rebuttal over peacebuilding initiatives have been over the overwhelming categorization of 'failed states' or 'weak states,' meaning countries who digress back into conflict after international intervention, or superficial government institutions that persistently leave the majority of citizenship living below standards of development (i.e. below acceptable standards to ensure a right to life according to the Commission of Human Rights), and/or a shift to an authoritarian rule of governance.[4] An effective and otherwise successful installment of liberal peace would be to democratize how a state delivers 'political goods' commonly assessed as domestic and border security, a systematized way of adjudicating disputes, pathways to public participation in the political sphere, the upkeep of civil infrastructure and communication technologies, social services such as healthcare and education, institutions to support fiscal investments and entrepreneurial pursuits, and mechanisms to sustain and share 'environmental commons.' (Rotberg, 2003).

Embedded in the rhetoric of LPB is a pragmatic and moral imperative which derives from its historical inception which says International Peacebuilding is essential for global security, and therefore a destabilized and/or threatened state is a threat to global stability (Helman & Ratner, 1992; Englebert & Tull, 2008). Peacebuilding itself, or more importantly the UN incentive for 'post-conflict peacebuilding' began with the decrees made by

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[4] For the full list of Human Rights issues as referenced by the OHCHR see https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Pages/ListOfIssues.aspx

Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's report *An Agenda for Peace* in June 1992; a time period which was presented with the onset of civil war in Afghanistan, the Bosnian War and continued unrest in most notably Somalia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda and East Timor.[5] After a decade of not only prolonged, but increased conflict and state collapses the international community began to reassess not liberal intentions within themselves but how the processes of implementing these models and institutions in post-conflict states may lead to more sustainable outcomes (which one could argue is also a time frame when Peace and Conflict Studies alongside Development Studies saw a surge in both students and the establishment of programs).

1.2 Localizing Trends in Liberal Peacebuilding

At this stage it was not up to the International community alone, but increasingly since the 2000's, programs which emphasized local partnerships were inherent in LPB, at least in principle, and became necessary in order to be legitimized (Donias, 2009; Dzuverovic, 2018; MacGinty, 2015; Paffenholz, 2015).[6] One would assume that liberalism gone 'local' in peacebuilding would turn away from top-down approaches and put lesser value on the prescripted implementation of institutions and democratic mechanisms such as national elections and put more priority on participatory development programs alongside capacity building in strategic sectors. This is exactly the objective of many peacebuilding missions today; however, problems persist in making this transition fluid due to fundamental flaws in 'real' power sharing. However, problems such as abdicating project control is not in the direct interest of the donor government or agency and the fact that critical decisions and project alignment are not locally owned at the substantive level as a resultof disproportionate power relationships (Pietz & Carlowitz, 2007). MacGinty demonstrates in his article "Where is the local? Critical Localism and Peacebuilding", that indeed this local shift provides "access, legitimacy, value for money, cultural sensitivity, linguistic skills and could facilitate a swifter exit for international actors" (846). The fatal flaw here is that the drivers and donors of 'local' and 'sustainable' peacebuilding are not required to reconstruct their models and implementation of programs, but merely their nomenclature.

There are constantly evolving 'hybrid' options which keep important questions of power, knowledge, and legitimacy at the forefront of long-term peacebuilding and development programs The concept of hybridity moves beyond the polarities of 'international' and 'local,' in response to impasses in attempts to 'graft' democracy in post-conflict nations such as Cambodia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Haiti, and Afghanistan (Call & Cooke, 2003; Chandler, 2004). Donias (2009) isolates a constitutive lesson from peacebuilding efforts within the last decade as revealing "the limits of international power and authority in post-war contexts" (10), and therefore hybridity reconciles these limitations by consensus building and negotiating real power sharing across both horizontal and vertical axes. Theorists and practitioners in the field of post-conflict LPB today utilize hybridity as a concept to continuously confront questions of power, knowledge and legitimacy which are acknowledged by conservative and critical observers alike to be root causes of sustained poverty, coupled with entrenched inequality in many regions of the globe. More uses, definitions, and possible practical applications of hybridity within Timor-Leste, and more specifically within the organization La'o Hamutuk, will be further examined in the third chapter of this paper.

1.3 Liberal Peacebuilding in the Case of Timor-Leste

1.3.1 Peacebuilding at the National Level

Timor-Leste, known more commonly as East Timor, is a country significantly marked by colonization and annexation and of course the violence, displacement, and

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[5] For an index on list of wars and conflict per year and per decade see https://www.onwar.com/aced/chrono/index
[6] MacGinty (2015) illustrates the indisputable shift of focus by comparing Boutros-Ghali's *An Agenda for Peace,* where the word local is not referenced once, to the World Bank's 2011 World Development Report mentioning the word 'local' 382 times and the UNDP's 2011 Governance for Peace document mentioning the word 'local' 197 times (p.840).

underdevelopment which shadows these circumstances. The invasion of Timor-Leste by Indonesia on December 7, 1975, under the consent of the international community (in particular the US and Australia), happened less than a year after the withdrawal of formerly occupying Portugal. After enduring centuries of colonization this half-island nation of approximately 1.2 million people, lost nearly one third of its population during the 24-year occupation by Indonesia, which violently occupied Timor in response to the armed resistance party, 'FALINTIL,' who had declared independence of the country at the withdrawal of Portugal in 1975 amongst two other competing political parties (AJAR & ACBIT, 2016; CAVR, 2005).[7]

The country was reported as a success to the international peacekeeping mission when UN oversaw the 1999 referendum under the Habibi administration of Indonesia, followed by a UN transitional government. The UN officially gave over authority to an elected and nominated government in Timor in 2002, and the final report of the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation, or CAVR[8] (*Chega! The Final Report of the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation*), being published and given over to the executive branches of government in 2005 (Kent, 2015; Paris, 2010). The final report made recommendations regarding how to further address (at a national, bilateral, and international level) the gross human rights violations, but since 2005, in concurrence with the signing of the Commission of Truth and Friendship between Indonesia and Timor-Leste governing bodies[9], a lack of political will perpetually undermines the need for funding and the construction of institutions to meet these recommendations. The bi-lateral Commission of Truth and Friendship between Indonesia and Timor-Leste governments was controversial since its inception; as it is noted by many grassroots and civil society activists and scholars that the commission was erected to block the progression of any persecutions to be formalized under a UN suggested Special Crimes Unit and to agree to a "conclusive" truth on the post-referendum violence enacted by Indonesian military in 1999 (Starting, 2014).[10] The perilous slopes of navigating justice, stability, democratization, and basic infrastructure development were all paramount in the transitional period of state-reconstruction during the periods of 1999-2002.

The United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), in collaboration with the political party leadership of CNRT (the National Council of Timorese Resistance) and FRETILIN focused energies to set up the mechanisms, institutions and framework agenda setting for a democratic and semi-presidential system (Borgerhoff, 2006, pgs.101-105). After the 'successful' transition, and a high voter turn-out rate, there was much rhetorical promise for the young nation despite a severe lack of infrastructure or industrialization to ensure any economic growth. Previous vendettas, power dynamics and allowances given to certain political elites set the stage for internal conflict between the police forces and military (and other violent/gang related factions) in the country in 2006, leading to another dispatch of UNMIT Peacekeeping forces to stabilize the resurgence in violence (Chopra, 2002; Cotton, 2007; Kingsbury; 2007).

1.3.2 Retaining Sovereignty Through Civil Society in Timor-Leste

The space for Civil Society, as a mouthpiece for the people to the government and vis-à-vis, is a crucial element of democratization and the legitimation of democratic mechanisms. Within a liberal democratic framework, the role of civil society is to serve as a public mouthpiece between private sphere, economic markets, and government bodies (Rucht, 2011). While explaining differing models of democracy, Gordon White (1994)

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[7] FALINTIL was the armed wing of the political party FRETILIN which claimed independence from Portugal in 1974 as the result of a brief civil conflict between FRETILIN (pro-Timorese independence and socialist democratic policies), UDT (pro Portuguese alignment), and APODETI (pro-Indonesian integration).

[8] See *Chega! The Final Report of the Comission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation*). Download the final report at http://www.chegareport.net/download-chega-products-2/

[9] For a panel discussion on defining the purpose of the Commission of Truth and Friendship co-hosted by La'o Hamutuk see https://www.laohamutuk.org/Bulletin/2005/Apr/bulletinv6n1.html#Panel_Discussion

[10] The post referendum violence in Timor-Leste enacted by TNI and Indonesian aligning paramilitary groups was devastating. It is estimated that within a week the military forces destroyed 70% of the region's infrastructure, forcibly displaced 250,000 persons, systematically raped Timorese women and girls, and killed up to 2,000 civilians. See Nevins (2002).

finds a concurrence in the definition of civil society organizations as "themselves potential microcosms of democracy, practicing in their internal relations the kind of 'organizational citizenship' which makes each of them a basic building block in the edifice of a national-level democratic system" (White, 1994, pp 387-388). This concept of civil societies became more conventional and has been part of analysis during the late 1980's and 1990's, particularly after conflicts and reconstruction periods in Eastern Europe (1994). Thriving civil societies are not only catalytic for democratization processes but increasingly more so considered as foundational for development implementation as well, being linked with processes of local legitimization through local and national NGO implementation of large-scale, multi-district projects (Carothers & Barndt, 1999; Dibley, 2014; Popplewell, 2019).

For the purposes of this report, I will provide a broad focus on the evolution of the relationship of international agencies and/or donor relations with local activists in the co-creation of civil society in Timor-Leste. La'o Hamutuk has a shared history with civil society origins as original aims for human rights in Timor-Leste were initially metamorphosed as a legitimate pursuit through underground international solidarity networks due to the regions barred status by Indonesia; the involvement of members of the Catholic church, self-formed solidarity groups and international aid agencies such as The Red Cross and OXFAM were the first engagements with human rights advocacy within the country. However, since independence "Peacebuilding approaches in East Timor have until recently been largely reactive and shaped by changing understandings—or misunderstandings—of the nature of conflict" (Wallis et. al, 2018, p. 185). This is evident in the increase of violence prevention programs and social security reform and/or security monitoring focused NGOs after the 2006 crisis, as well as more economic based programs trying to meet the source of conflict via alleviating widespread unemployment in the country while much of the country still lives without sustained water access and is dependent on sustenance farming for their livelihood (Wallis et. al, 2018).

As will be explained more thoroughly in Chapter Two, LH was an advocate for more government spending in social programs needed for citizens such as water and sanitation, agriculture, healthcare, and education; however, an observation I made during my time in the country that it is not only the government short sighting spending in basic needs for the country but international donors, and therefore local NGO's as well. This continuing lack of basic needs security in Timor-Leste is not a subject which will be able to be more examined in this report, however, the link between government, International, and NGO priorities is going to be a continued theme throughout.

Chapter Two: Liberal Peacebuilding and Hybridity at the Organizational Level

2.1 La'o Hamutuk

2.1.1 History, Vision and Mission

Technically, La'o Hamutuk ('Walking Together' in the Tetum language of Timor-Leste) celebrates its anniversary of inception from the year 2000, founded as an organization months after Timor-Leste's referendum on August 30th, 1999. However, the organization can be viewed as an indication of decades of international and bilateral efforts of solidarity and activism undergone between the 1980s until today. The East Timor Action Network (ETAN) was founded in 1991[11] and impressively utilized technologies, direct government engagement and public protest to thwart the United States' implicit and explicit support of Indonesia on a political and economic scale, as well as its' extensive sales of weapons and accompanied military training to Indonesian forces.

Circulating accurate information during 1975-1991 was critical on two fronts while Indonesia highly restricted access to Timor-Leste from the rest of the world during this period. This limited access to conditions in Timor-Leste on the ground secured Indonesian trade alliances in exchange for legitimation of its sovereignty claims to East Timor (Simpson, 2014). It was ETAN's key strategies of providing impartial and accurate information

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[11] ETAN formalized its networking as a timely response to the international broadcasting of what became known as the Santa Cruz Massacre November 12th, 1991. It was the first notable documentation of the killing of hundreds of Timorese youths.

to as many people as possible, public shaming through the building of a network affiliated by a common virtue of human rights and keeping their aims in solidarity with Timorese activists while simultaneously expanding international credibility which carried itself into the work of present-day work of La'o Hamutuk.

2.1.2 Structure and Funding

LH as an institution for monitoring and analysis is divided into six separate research teams and eight coordinating positions. Staff members have a placement on one or multiple research sectors and holds a position on one organizational body (an organizational body meaning logistics such as monitoring of grant applications and reporting, organizational finances, travel coordination, and maintenance). When I entered the organization the research teams were divided between topics of Land and Agriculture, Economy and Petroleum, Major Development Projects and Environment, Governance and Human Rights, State Finances, and Gender.[12] The organizational tasks were divided by Coordination, Fundraising, Human Resources, Radio Program Editor, Bulletin Publication Editor. There are four other additional staff members who hold the responsibilities of finances, logistics, security, and other administrative needs who do not hold positions on research teams but still contribute and participate in bi-weekly forum meetings.

Agriculture and Land consisted of two staff researchers (one of whom was Timorese who had recently taken a leave of absence for a Chevening scholarship), Human Rights and Governance with four research staff (three of whom served on other research teams), Economy/Petroleum/State Finances had five staff researchers (two of whom served on other research teams and two others who were international staff researchers), and Major Projects and Environment had two staff researchers.

Forum meetings are an internal way the organization adheres to its own democratic and participatory vision for Timor-Leste; since the organization is non-hierarchical, research priorities, team and individual updates, administrative decisions are decided upon by the collective in bi-weekly forum meetings. Special forum meetings are organized by Coordinating Staff members for emergency meetings (e.g., if the organization needs to respond to certain media outlets, local or international policy decisions, and/or decisions made over new or trial staff and interns). Typical hours as an employee of La'o Hamutuk are from 9:00 a.m. – 6:00 p.m. Mo-Fri, with one hour for lunch at the time of the staff's choosing/availability, while many staff continue their research and/or writing tasks after hours and over the weekend.

It is important to note that La'o Hamutuk is one of very few, if not the only, non-governmental organization in the country not accepting funds from donors who could have vested and/or compromised interests such as the local government, the UN, ADB, World Bank, etc. It is not within the breadth of this paper to identify alternative and underlying motivations that such bodies have when funding civil society associations overall, but this distinction from other non-profits reveals LH as being more autonomous in the event that they feel the need to personally criticize governmental and international agency decision making regarding the development and well-being of Timor-Leste. As part of LH's policy, abiding by its mission and vision of non-partisan monitoring and analysis, the organization only receives its funding from private donations, small country governments, and personal fundraising. At the time of this internship, LH had three different donor organizations supporting their staff and projects: MISEREOR (a funding organization most notable for longer term donations), TAF, and Hivos. Another way in which LH staff retain transparency is by giving all research staff the same salary, unaffected by prior experience and/or years of working for the organization.

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[12] After LH's most recent strategic planning meeting (December 2018-January 2019) a minor restructuring of the research teams was decided upon due to the number of staff and priority of publishing within the last year whereby the teams were divided into Land and Agriculture, Economy and State Finances, Human Rights and Governance (gender research done under HR and governance), and Major Development Projects and Environment (Petroleum Infrastructure research under this team).

2.1.3 Overarching Positions

One could project that LH is liberally minded in its foci and publications, while being critical in its structure and undergirding principles. While Timor-Leste has no shortage of NGO's, LH is the only organization to directly challenge state budgets and the technical economic aspects of major development projects (at least on a consistent basis). While the organization takes a position on environmental justice, impunity for past crimes, and the need for more implementation of sustainable development strategies, it's key platform on a national and international level (a trend seen since the realization of a long-pursued Maritime Treaty Agreement between Australia and Timor-Leste in 2014) concerns the detrimental side-effects of Timor-Leste being an extremely oil-dependent nation, and is vulnerable to the risks of prioritizing in the investment of large infrastructure projects (i.e. airports, ports, etc.) which would establish support for further large revenue investment into the country over long-term infrastructure development plans (electrical lining, water pipelines, etc.) which would provide the basic needs for a higher percent of the population. Recent reporting from the Asia Development Bank and the World Bank highlight the improved access to water, electricity, and sanitation standards in urban areas but rural regions are still lacking these amenities at a disproportional scale, especially when considering that an estimated 70% of Timorese still live in rural regions of the country.[13] LH continually asserts that oil funds are not alleviating Timor-Leste's severe poverty rates, the growing divide between urban and rural access to government services, and/or decreasing its dependency on donor states.[14] Other red flags for Timor's path to sustainable development are represented by RDTL initiatives made with the petroleum fund;   continued excessive borrowing, major investment into projects which don't have realistic projections (such as the Tasi Mane project and the ZEESM project in Oecusse district), sidelining alternative non-oil revenues, streamlining benefits to urban and political elites, and the perpetuation of high-level decision making being steered by petroleum revenue.[15]

La'o Hamutuk takes a public stance that the lack of redress on past crimes is a matter of injustice to the Timorese population as well as impunity for international justice. This ostensibly radical position which demands an international tribunal for past crimes[16] simultaneously shares its rationale with a liberal worldview promoted by the UN which affirms the statement that a lack of justice for past crimes "undermines future stability, security and rule of law."[17]The organization has not pressured the state or other relevant international institutions as heavily on this issue since 2012, due to a persistent lack of will from both governments (Timorese and Indonesian). Rather, the organization has addressed certain political actions as linking present injustices with past impunity for gross violations of human rights and holds the position that an end to impunity is essential to any enduring stability and peace for a nation.

A significant amount of LH's policy recommendation surrounding social conditions and welfare are proposed under a human rights framework. Rights in terms of agriculture and the environment are often prioritized in a conservationist model approach with clear objectives to increase citizen knowledge of their rights of consultation processes in terms of development and industrial projects within their territories. LH has more recently also involved itself to support rural agriculture such as the promotion of local seed sourcing

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[13] See World Bank Summary report published in 2018 of improved access conditions here https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2018/05/15/new-report-on-timor-lestes-water-sector-can-guide-future-investments . See ADB data on poverty alleviation here https://www.adb.org/countries/timor-leste/poverty#accordion-0-1. See an assessment of TL's underinvestment in water infrastructure in contrast to oil investment in the 2019 Diplomat article "Timor-Leste: Why Water is More Important than Oil" by Christopher Ryan here https://thediplomat.com/2019/08/timor-leste-why-water-is-more-important-than-oil/.

[14] According to a Sustainability public presentation LH made in 2019 37% of children are malnourished in Timor-Leste and 55% of that population lives in rural areas. Also relevant to policy making and development planning favoring the urban centers was the finding that 65% of the current population has a livelihood of agriculture while only 1.6% of state expenditure is allotted to agriculture.

[15] See https://laohamutuk.org/Oil/TasiMane/11TasiMane.htm#prioritizing for LH's updated monitorization of the proposed Tasi Mane and Zeesm major infrastructure development project. This web page expresses explicitly the concern LH research staff has for RDTL's budget allotment, allocating "over $30 million for the Tasi Mane project, more than twice as much for the Minister of Agriculture."

[16] La'o Hamutuk is still part of a 2009 international alliance referred to as A.N.T.I, Timor-Leste National Alliance for an International Tribunal. For an official letter to the OHCHR depicting A.N.T.I's position on justice for gross human rights crimes in Timor-Leste see https://www.laohamutuk.org/Justice/ANTI/ANTI-toOHCHR5Oct2011.pdf

[17] Summarized by the author from a presentation by La'o Hamutuk on "Rights and Sustainability on Timor-Leste Development (April 2019).

and diversifying crop development for the increase of supply and demand of local products.

Chapter Three: Analyses of Hybridity as Function or Outcome

3.1 Reflection: Making the Intersection Between La'o Hamutuk and Liberal Peacebuilding

Reflecting on the objective outcomes of my internship there are three major trends which I see relevant to gaps within LPB which intersect with my experience. This is a framework tool to understand how the macro-level agenda of LPB has potentially affected the micro-level, rather than a statement of how LH supports the LPB agenda and thereby encounters these tensions. The three I will focus on are both practical applications of hybrid methods used, and theoretical observations based on the literature; 1) A lack of alternatives to LPB critiques, 2) The realistic implications of short-term strategies for long-term goal setting, and 3) The assumed objectivity of liberal frameworks.

3.1.1 A lack of alternatives to liberal peacebuilding critiques

I first want to address the academic field of Peace and Conflict Studies literature and its own barriers to identifying more pluralistic perspectives. Dzuverovic (2018), a Peace and Conflict scholar from Belgrade University, acknowledges that much of 'local' knowledge (of PACS studies) is attained through academic contracting where in truth "the academic community should acknowledge that the absence of locals impedes the quality of the liberal peace debate, and [should] act accordingly so that the debate about empowerment does not end up taking place without those who need empowering" (p.126). In essence, Dzuverovic is giving a qualitative analysis of the axiology of PACS research, revealing that many critiques given to the localization of peacebuilding in developing and post-conflict countries cannot be done so without also recognizing those critiques are relevant to the very institution providing the research, and henceforth establishing the researcher. Within my own research and internship, I recognized that my own placement within this perpetual cycle occluded me from being able to thoroughly engage with alternatives to liberal peacebuilding even from an academic approach. At the heart of this tension is possibly embedded with PACS institutional origins which has expanded out of the original tension "between a sound knowledge base and a commitment to values" (Ryan, 2013, p.82).

A reoccurring critique within Timor-Leste from government agencies as well as other civil society organizations (and presented in the local media) is that La'o Hamutuk only passes judgement on government development plans and infrastructure projects rather than provide alternatives. Other staff members also presented this as a valid critique in the strategic planning meeting and in a staff forum meeting. While it is a mission of LH to pursue alternative and diversifying methods of development, this is not specific in a way which separates it from the jargon of other international development agencies working in the country. La'o Hamutuk aims for more participatory and transparent development models but the use of a "highly consultative processes" where "capacity building is integral" is also key to the development initiatives of the UNDP. The water research I focused on during my internship is in alignment with the 17 Sustainable Development Goals as is a key purpose of ADB's water investment plans and reports, and the World Bank Group recognizes the "importance of water management to the government's objectives of economic diversification."   As I assessed this critique from my own readings of LH's publications, I observed that when recommendations were made along with critiques of development plans and/or government budgets, the language of LH's policy and program recommendations were indistinguishable from the agencies (ADB, IMF, etc.) whose development priorities and programs they seek to make amendments to.

For example, in multiple of LH's published articles, critiques and in-depth analyses are made to warn about the negative repercussions of the economic development schemes essentialized by government and international agencies which use the same rationale that these multiple powerful stakeholders are utilizing to legitimate their policies and development priorities.   In other words, both the government and international agencies

employ the same human rights-oriented verbiage used by LH in its public statements and presentations. As Paffenholz (2015) acknowledges in her assessment on LPB scholarship, "it becomes clear that the international peacebuilding discourse is trapped in the 'liberal imperative' (p.861). An exception to this I was able to witness during my internship within the specific example for water could be its publication rejecting Private Public Partnership (PPP) schemes[18]whereas private investments and the promise of foreign investments are frequently supported in general statements from notable development agencies such as the World Bank, ADB, and IMF.[19] This paper suggests that LBP scholarship, international agencies, key actors in government, and grassroots activists alike are "trapped in the liberal imperative," having a negative side effect of obscuring power relations, making alternative movements and organizations vulnerable to elite capture, and stalling the allocation of resources where it is needed most.

There is an acknowledgement of the 'local turn' in the last decade within LPB, where local ownership of development agendas and projects serve to legitimize typically interventionist development models (Lee & Ozerdem, 2015; MacGinty, 2015; Pietz & Carlowitz, 2007; Paffenholz, 2015). Hybrid development models have also been presented as both a new pathway for development and/or a result of a non-binary categorizing of the 'local' and the 'international' within development project implementation, planning, and assessment. La'o Hamutuk could be an exemplary case study of practical versus theoretical hybrid processes in development and civil society organizations.

3.1.2 The realistic implications of short-term strategies for long-term goal setting

The realistic implications of short-term strategies for long-term goal setting for this report applies chiefly to capacity building and local participation regarding basic civil infrastructure and the establishment of prosperous socio-economic conditions. During my time at LH, I was able to grasp how the organization engaged publicly; this occurred through public presentations, representation at civil society meetings, parliamentary hearings, and at youth events. It was evident throughout this three-and-a-half-month period that my colleagues invested more time into higher-level society members (i.e., government officials, political party leaders, international delegates, and international/national journalists) versus making space for capacity building of nonprofessional citizens which seemed to persistently stay on 'the back burner' of goal realization. This is not inherently a problem; however, I am noting it due to the organizations own mission statement which emphasizes the importance of the average Timorese individual is able to make informed decisions to its national development processes by saying that "the people of Timor-Leste must be the ultimate arbiters of the reconstruction process and, thus, that the process should be as democratic and transparent as possible."

Assessing this pattern with theories behind goal setting in social organizations as well as from literature on LPB it seems that the struggle to reconcile an organization's future goal with the present needs and circumstance of its surroundings is not singular to LH. A foundational function of goal setting is "essentially a problem of defining desired relationships between an organization and its environment" (Thompson & McEwen, 1958, p. 23). When putting this definition in context, the organization is constantly adapting to its environmental factors so that it has a service and/or good utility to those it is in relation with to maintain relevance and legitimacy (1958, pp. 25-29). To contextualize this, LH, as a flat structured organization and vision statement being antithetical to neoliberal agendas which sustain a capitalist global economy, is constantly legitimizing its actions and objectives to a government and international bodies from within a liberal ethos.

This is important to hold under scrutiny because dependent upon where an organization places its values (and an individual staff member for that matter), certain research teams (and thereby staff members and their individual priorities within the organization)

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[18] This article can be found in the organization's most recent bulletin (Nov. 2018), and an online version here https://www.laohamutuk.org/Bulletin/2018/Nov/bulletinv19n2te.htm#PPP (in Tetum language)

[19] For a fairly recent (2016) critical comment from the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) see "Public-Private Partnerships and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development" by Jomo, K. S., Chowdhury, A., Sharma, K., & Platz, D. and for a critical case study analysis of the support of private investment for developing national economies see "External Debt and Private Investment in Nigeria" by Olayide Olayinka (2019).

within La'o Hamutuk are systematically receiving less attention without being able to include that pattern into the re-assessment of their mission statement and strategic initiatives.[20] This pattern, unlike the case for most local NGO's, does not occur due to infringing expectations from international donor partners. To LH's benefit, it has been able to sustain donors which secure what is becoming known in the development world as an 'authentic partnership' (Dibley, 2014), typically allowing LH to maintain its own elected research and activity priorities with the understanding that regular reports are maintained.   The mission statements of La'o Hamutuk are compatible with those of their funders even though ultimately LH's accomplishments, publications and reactionary foci within the last five years are predominantly focused on the economic side of development (state finances, major industrial projects, and oil resource expenditures) which is critically important but standing alone does not comfortably fit itself into a LPB initiative, in other words, a funded initiative. This brings into question whether the leadership of La'o Hamutuk would singularly focus on economic concerns of development, excluding other interrelated topics such as agriculture and human rights if there were more funding schemes available which explicitly supported the monitorization of economic development.

3.1.3 Capacity Building as Strategy

Capacity building is defined by the UNDP as "the process through which individuals, organizations and societies obtain, strengthen and maintain the capabilities to achieve their own development objectives over time." Additionally, there are four key components which exist for the fulfillment of successful capacity development: adaptive and appropriate institutional arrangements; transparent leadership; relevant and continued access to knowledge; and accountability mechanisms in place.[21] Critical scholars of LPB acknowledge capacity building (or capacity development) as integral to LPB agenda setting but often lacking in sustainable mechanisms or a tangible result in actual empowerment of local initiatives and instead serving as another form of 'soft power' (Chandler, 2015; Richmond & Franks, 2008; Richmond, 2017).   From my experience with LH capacity building, though inherently linked to the mission of inclusion and participation, did not seem to be effectively structured in a way which was satisfying to the collective staff body, both at an internal level (i.e., amidst the staff's internal capacity development)[22] and external (i.e., the capacity development given as a service from LH to other members of civil society, students, and or generally affected communities). This was noted by my participation in regular staff meetings where multiple staff members calling for more engagement with rural grassroots organizations and student groups but not finding support for such initiatives by longer serving staff members.

Although all research staff of LH have the same status within the collective, they obviously come into the organization with varying niche skills. At the time of my internship there were three (including myself) international staff (one being the co-founder now living part-time in the U.S). Two of the international staff were focused on the economics and petroleum research team which has the majority of publications and visual graphs to share on the LH website to be accessible to the public. Many staff members serving on other research teams stated that they wanted to extend their capacity in making graphics and data mapping during the LH strategic planning meeting. Half of the research staff during these reflection sessions also wanted to look for methods for LH's resources to be more accessible to the greater public; even though the internet provides all their resources

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[20] This could be for various reasons. I was not at the organization long enough to formulate a specific claim as to why or how seemingly consistent patterns were not able to be addressed and/or changed within the organization. It could be one of the challenges of a flat structured organization, particularly within a dominant patriarchal society where no one person takes an initiative for change due to not feeling they are operating within the authority to do so. It could also be likely that there are implicit authorities within the organization who are not providing adequate space and time to address such issues.

[21] See *Capacity Development: A UNDP Primer* at https://www.undp.org/content/dam/aplaws/publication/en/publications/capacity-development/capacity-development-a-undp-primer/CDG_PrimerReport_final_web.pdf

[22] During my internship it appeared that the legitimacy LH had established for itself offered beneficial opportunities for staff members. One staff member I never met because he was accepted a Chevening Scholarship to SOAS University UK. Another newer staff member being trained in the economy and state finances team was able to go to an international economic conference alongside LH co-founder Charles Scheiner, and a governance team researcher had the opportunity to due further research with an academic from Australia focused on Gender Studies.

'freely,' a lack of technology and/or other baseline knowledge of the topics hinder participation in the data LH provides online. For example, I only identified two university students active in using the library and availability of staff researchers during my 3-month internship. [23]

Capacity building itself hasn't always been integral to peacebuilding, at least not at the systemic level; it "has become a means of ensuring that Northern NGOs are able to rely on their local partners to perform effectively, rather than as an exercise in enabling and empowering Southern organizations to develop skills they urgently need" (Dibley, 2014, p.96). Often this lack of reflective focus on capacity needs sustains power imbalances between Northern and Southern organizations (2014). As will be further considered in section 3.2, there is a key focus on data analysis and graphic making which legitimizes LH's contribution to civil society at a national and international level which currently is not a skill any Timorese staff of LH can accomplish independently.

3.1.4 The Assumed Objectivity of Liberal Frameworks

Lastly, the assumed objectivity of a liberal framework is probably the most important critique coming from both conservative and critical scholars of LPB alike. As mentioned previously, I do not make the presupposition that LH would be for or against LPB initiatives at the institutional level but recognize the organization as a stakeholder and civil society member which has the potential to be influenced in its 'everyday' actions by such powerful doctrines of values and normativism whether they do or do not advocate directly for what would qualify as LBP policies and agendas. In Roland Paris' "Saving Liberal Peacebuilding" he argues many critics of LPB are in fact critiquing through a liberal lens themselves; with LH's mission to present "alternative forms of development" it is still doing so within a human rights framework, with values grounded in the protection of the individual, rights to property and market engagement, and doesn't directly confront the underdevelopment and inequalities essential to sustaining global capitalism (Rimlinger, 1983; Nowak, 2016). While serving under the human rights and governance research team I found myself and my colleagues limited by human rights as a justification for any policy recommendation coming from their research when it came to access to education, water and sanitation, health, etc. As part of a team of critical thinkers I found myself surprised by this rationale, not on the grounds that it doesn't have merit, but rather it prevents people from visualizing in a responsible and discernible way what 'human rights' is supposed to look like in an 'everyday reality' (Kent, 2015; de Carvalho et. al, 2019).

Safeguarding and/or instilling Human Rights has been a justification for many international interventions which La'o Hamutuk would or would not support, not to mention exists within the same value systems which allowed the U.S. to support Indonesia's occupation of Timor-Leste. It should be the responsibility of all those who work to ensure and think critically about human rights (whether that be in an individualistic or collectivist understanding, i.e. individual or social rights) to not undermine that the ideology of human rights was constructed in a particular time and place, and like all ideologies, it was constructed under distinct power structures to ensure the values of a dominant culture. [24] If there is not meticulous caution to the nuances and 'soft power' of liberal values then the exceptions will continue to be ignored. The exceptions I speak of are variant upon context but can generally be viewed as in-group needs of a marginalized social group within a society (even if and when those groups actually serve as the majority of a population). As political theorist philosopher Hannah Arendt pertinently said in her work *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (1951), "caution in handling generally accepted opinions that claim to explain whole trends of history is especially important for the historian of modern times, because the last century has produced an abundance of ideologies that pretend to be keys to history but are actually nothing but desperate efforts to escape responsibility" (p.9).

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[23] This period covered when schools and universities were and were not in session.

[24] Adom Getachew's *Worldmaking After Empire,* provides a comprehensive analysis of how liberal democratic principles and norm setting was co-constructed in serving to legitimate colonial empire and further European economic and political authority during the period of decolonization. Her research supports these claims by historically reframing the post WWI And WWII periods of establishing international order, confronting underlying justifications for the formation of the United Nations and human rights.

Arendt is identifying here that promising ideologies will equally have the capacity to be wielded as a tool used to exonerate destructive historical trends. If civil society internally and externally is not actively re-working the frameworks of human rights to their own context, then who in society is? Hybrid methodologies are the closest trends in international/local peacebuilding which have the contingency to working through this question and to resolving to what extent it is possible.

In the next section I will use these findings of LPB as an ideology and basis for policy agendas at large considering its potentiality of being a significant influencing factor to La'o Hamutuk as an independent non-profit organization operating within Timorese civil society. This will be done to evaluate where there already hybridized instruments being used to assimilate incongruent international idealism and objectives to local realities, as well as where further practices could be established at the organizational level to overcome these potential hindrances to goal realization.

3.2 LA'O Hamutuk as a Space for Practicing Hybridity as Instrument

Building from the introduction on hybridity from Chapter One of this report, hybrid forms of peacebuilding have variances in utility. Hameri & Jones reference Visoka in their Chapter in *Hybridity on the Ground in Peacebuilding and Development: Critical Conversations* (2018) define hybridization as "a process whereby discrete structures or practices, previously existing in separate form, are combined to generate new structures, objects and practices" (p.104).   This practice of taking two separate entities to create 'the grey zone' of an unknown outcome happens by moving past binaries of 'local' versus 'international' interests to identify how individuals and groups wield power at multiple levels using varied perspectives and vocabulary of "traditional" and/or "modern" to meet their own objectives (MacGinty, 2015).

When considering La'o Hamutuk as a case study this complexity can take form; as a flat structured organization international staff and local staff collaborate under the same mission, using the Tetum and English languages to broaden their legitimacy and scope within Timor-Leste and abroad with its affiliated networks. The questions hybridity asks about 'who has ultimate project control?' and 'who has the power to attain and disseminate knowledge?' are ones which can constantly be written and re-written within the forum meetings of the LH collective. However, what becomes critical to the answers and ensuring that these questions have a sustained affect may rest upon whether hybridity is used as an outcome or an instrumental tool by the organizations engaging in collaborative efforts.

3.2.1 Hybridity as Instrumental or as Outcome?

A relevant assessment of hybridity to the La'o Hamutuk case study is Miranda Forsyth's (2018) article "Should the Concept of Hybridity be Used Normatively as well as Descriptively?" Her work is situated within primarily legal/regulatory systems utilizing case studies from Vanuatu and other Pacific Island nations. Forsyth makes the important argument that "hybridity as a normative concept is always going to be intrinsically concerned with privilege and power" (73). Moving forward with this approach she encourages debates which should be occurring customarily to unmask values and objectives which could have fundamental differing motivations and assumptions in settings such as Timor-Leste. Examples of such debates include the navigation of multiple and divergent legal systems, assessing different processes of change across varying ontologies and material realities, and focusing on various actors' relationships with governance bodies.

Scholarly works on indigeneity in Timor-Leste presents a dynamic relationship of world views embedded in customary and modern practices, imbued with other realities and narratives resulting from occupation and colonization (Brown, 2012; Close, 2017). An awareness of multiple worldviews intersecting daily and on multiple societal levels in Timor-Leste, brings objectivity into question. The work of LH is viewed as objective by certain populations of Timor-Leste and whether it is successful in reaching their organizational goals of unbiased participation in the development of the nation needs to be

inquired by those within the organization. This is not a question to be answered deliberately but worked through regularly within the organization itself and with their affected networks and beneficiaries.

3.2.2 Dialogue and Pedagogy

From classroom settings, work office settings and to post-conflict transitional justice measurements, inner-group dialogue has proven to have a host of benefits when there is allotted time and space to do as such. Empowerment through dialogue, often associated with the pedagogical theory of Paulo Freire, has become a cornerstone of community development but seems to lose its effective capacity or relevance when it comes to critical scholarship and/or rigorous workplaces. Even when it comes to sustainable project implementation, inclusive dialogue is not as prioritized as say monitoring and evaluation may be. In contrast, the word 'dialogue' is used generically without the specificities necessary for regular follow through. Defining dialogue must be contextual, but there are characteristics which can be useful when facilitating necessary discussions such as Feller and Ryan's (2012) characteristics of effective dialogue; coexistence, movement, encountering 'the other,' assumption, creativity, and flexibility, sharing, holistic [in nature], and multi-generational.

Through dialogue, important qualities such as inclusion, human rights and participatory principles can have personal meaning, while often critiqued exceptions or idealistic pseudo-realities can be broken down to create more tangible examples and definitions of what is desired by the community or collaborating groups (Ungerleider, 2012). Within La'o Hamutuk each individual staff member carries with herself or himself a background, a socioeconomic status which does not disintegrate under a flat structure, or even an equal salary, though it certainly is an important precursor to rending the societal barriers which often inhibit social movements and organizations working for social change from within. Whether the practice of critical pedagogy stays in classrooms or other specific educational programs is up to each organization working for social change to decide for itself, but there are few alternatives to date which effectively check power while increasing participation and social capital at the community and micro-organizational level (Gill & Niens, 2014).

3.2.5 Sustaining Legitimacy Differently: A Review of Assessment and Recommendations

Historically, LH has come together to ensure human rights for the Timorese people, and today LH stands at the forefront of promoting socioeconomic rights and presenting transparently the socio-economic injustices perpetuated by the state and/or international agencies through providing "non-partisan analysis of international activities in the territory with the goal of facilitating greater levels of effective Timorese participation in the reconstruction and development of the country."[25] As a collective, the organization has worked tirelessly to sustain its legitimacy at the societal, political, and international level simultaneously due to its important critical analysis and consistency in providing transparency for Timorese citizens about higher-level decision making. LH further protects its objectivity through its sources of funding and flat structure.

However, during a short duration of just under three months it was apparent in this internship through the participation in bi-weekly forum meetings, conversations with colleagues and a three-day strategic planning session that communication infrastructure amongst colleagues and communication strategies to their beneficiaries still lacked the efficacy desired by the staff members of the organization, expressed by staff comments on the under prioritization of certain research agendas as well as a feeling of isolation in day to day work activities. In this chapter I have framed these inhibitors through gaps found at the macro level of LPB initiatives from peacebuilding and development literature which could also be preventing LH from obtaining its participatory ambitions in Timor-Leste. In other words, I have attempted to understand how the macro level culture and norms of

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[25] Quoted from LH Mission Statement

LBP have infiltrated the working life and objectives of LH on the micro level. In my review of hybrid and LPB literature I found the concept of 'the everyday' utilized by academics looking to make practical use out of the theory of hybrid peacebuilding and development; in other words, investing more time and energy into the daily facets and interfaces of life are needed to make hybrid solutions legitimate.

For this concept to be utilized by LH, I recommend that it would require collective meetings which not only focus around work related immediate decision making but also take time to review with whom and where priorities were shifting within the organization, what word choices or statements are being either misinterpreted or dropped in a vacuum by the public and/or amongst colleagues themselves, and other significant ideological intersections which consciously and subconsciously affect their critical analysis. For example, asking, "what do we really intend when we support 'sustainable development,' and how is it different or the same from the UN Sustainable Development Goals," "how does Timor-Leste's history with human rights abuses still shape our work today," or "what are core economic principles our organization stands against and why?" It would involve stepping back, in order to move forward, focusing more energy on continuing important dialogues of human rights, sustainability, socioeconomic rights, etc. with communities, students and other civil society groups so that these words can turn into creative solutions rather than abstracted reasons why things should be different. It would take up the challenge of reclaiming aspects of liberal normative conceptualizations, not because they are wrong or automatically associated with neoliberal agendas but because of the extant power dynamics which easily perpetuate an exploitative and inequal status quo.

This could have the potential negative impact of reducing numbers of publications due to general lack of time and human resources, because having such dialogues and learning effective facilitation methods are significant investments in time. The investment into such critical dialogues could also lead to the need to produce more explanatory or popular publications which could also potentially put a strain on the organization's small staff number. However, the deeper understandings made within the organizational team and to its beneficiaries could also extend more pathways to legitimacy with certain groups of society with which the organization currently does not have substantial influence.

3.3 Interdependent Exchanges as Reflexive Practice in Peacebuilding and Development

The organizational lessons learned about the importance of 'everyday' communication and the potential setbacks caused by normative liberal frameworks are essentially democratic lessons at a micro-level scale. While there are varying types of democracy at a governmental level, principally, I can see as a scholar or practitioner within the field of PACS that I carry a responsibility to further expand and facilitate these participatory dialogues. I would extend this to the institutional level, recommending that Centers of Peace and Conflict Studies (e.g., myself, my fellow students, and respective faculty) need to not only present important information and research to the world, but be active in using that information to challenge dangerous assumptions, include diverse identities, and be able to identify power dynamics within their own organizations versus just 'in the field.' This has the capacity to happen within the classroom, but scarcely do individuals or groups of individuals challenge such norms outside of the classroom. There could be more tangible hybrid solutions formed if research and international engagement was interdependent in nature versus being asymmetrical and/or unilateral, with the result being external practices not impacting internal ones.

Conclusion

In this report I contextualized my practicum internship within the field of International Peacebuilding literature, specifically regarding LPB and Hybrid solutions resulting from liberal models of international intervention in post-conflict countries. I also provided a contextual history of peacebuilding initiatives in Timor-Leste as well as specifically to the NGO La'o Hamutuk, intersecting three observed inconsistencies in the organizational operations of LH with identified gaps in LPB literature:

- A lack of alternatives to liberal peacebuilding,
- The realistic implications of short-term strategies for long-term goal setting, and
- The assumed objectivity of the liberal framework.

I made a case for La'o Hamutuk as an organization already embedded with the groundwork necessary to be a successful case for hybrid solutions within critical development and peacebuilding. My main recommendations for the organization (with potential for extension to any other organization I work for and/or PACS institutions) was situated within critical pedagogy and peacebuilding education, as well as current literature on working uses and theories of hybridity within development and peacebuilding, ultimately emphasizing reflexive dialogue as an indispensable pathway to ensure participation at both micro and macro levels.

A further extension to this report would be the implementation of specific communication strategies within the organization and experimentation with the facilitation of dialogue on critical focus issues of LH with student groups and/or community members within and outside of the capital of Dili. Due to priority objectives within the organization and my own lack of confidence to take self-initiative within my research task at the time of my internship, my personal research contribution to the Human Rights and Governance team was less sufficient than I would have hoped. I am motivated to make further use of the information gathered during the internship to be able to contribute to research around access to water and repercussions of impunity in ways which could be relevant still while living outside Timor-Leste.

List of abbreviations

ADB	Asia Development Bank
A.N.T.I	Timor-Leste National Alliance for an International Tribunal
BESI	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
CAVR	Commission of Reception, Truth and Reconciliation in East Timor
CNRT	National Congress for Timorese Reconstruction
ETAN	East Timor Action Network
FALINTIL	National Liberation Armed Forces for East Timor
IMF	International Monetary Fund
LH	La'o Hamutuk (Tetum for 'Walk Together')
LPB	Liberal Peacebuilding
MISEREOR	The Catholic Bishops' Organisation for Development Cooperation
OHCHR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
PACS	Peace and Conflict Studies
PDR	Performance Development Review
PPP	Public Private Partnerships
RDTL	Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste
SDG'S	Sustainable Development Goals
TAF	The Asia Foundation
UN	The United Nations
UN-CPR	The United Nations University Centre for Policy Research
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNMIT	United Nations Mission in Timor-Leste
UNTAET	UN Transitional Administration in East Timor
WHO	World Health Organization
ZEESM	Special Economic Zone of Social Market Economy of Timor-Leste

Annex 1

La'o Hamutuk's Vision: The people of Timor-Leste, women and men, of current and future generations, will live in peace and contentment. They will control a transparent, just and sustainable development process which respects all people's cultures and rights. All citizens will benefit from Timor-Leste's resources, and will accept the responsibility for protecting them

Original Mission Statement from 2000: La'o Hamutuk is a joint Timor-Leste-international organization that seeks to monitor and to report on the activities of the principal international institutions present in Timor-Leste as they relate to the physical and social reconstruction of the country. The institute operates under the assumption that the people of Timor-Leste must be the ultimate arbiters of the reconstruction process and, thus, that the process should be as democratic and transparent as possible. In this regard, La'o Hamutuk provides non-partisan analysis of international activities in the territory with the goal of facilitating greater levels of effective Timorese participation in the reconstruction and development of the country. In addition to providing information on, and analysis of, the reconstruction and development processes, La'o Hamutuk works to improve communication between international institutions and organizations and the various sectors of Timorese society. Finally, La'o Hamutuk serves as a resource center, providing literature on different development models, experiences, and practices, as well as facilitating contacts between Timorese groups, and specialists and practioners involved in matters relating to development in various parts of the world.

Present Mission Statement: La'o Hamutuk is a joint Timor-Leste-international organization that seeks to monitor and to report on the activities of the principal international institutions present in Timor-Leste as they relate to the physical and social reconstruction of the country. The institute operates under the assumption that the people of Timor-Leste must be the ultimate arbiters of the reconstruction process and, thus, that the process should be as democratic and transparent as possible. In this regard, La'o Hamutuk provides non-partisan analysis of international activities in the territory with the goal of facilitating greater levels of effective Timorese participation in the reconstruction and development of the country. In addition to providing information on, and analysis of, the reconstruction and development processes, La'o Hamutuk works to improve communication between international institutions and organizations and the various sectors of Timorese society. Finally, La'o Hamutuk serves as a resource centre, providing literature on different development models, experiences, and practices, as well as facilitating contacts between Timorese groups, and specialists and practitioners involved in matters relating to development in various parts of the world.

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