{"id":4434,"date":"2020-03-25T21:41:47","date_gmt":"2020-03-25T09:41:47","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/blogs.otago.ac.nz\/emxphi\/?p=4434"},"modified":"2020-03-25T10:09:01","modified_gmt":"2020-03-24T22:09:01","slug":"nicolas-malebranche-critic-of-experimental-philosophy","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/blogs.otago.ac.nz\/emxphi\/nicolas-malebranche-critic-of-experimental-philosophy\/","title":{"rendered":"Nicolas Malebranche: Critic of Experimental Philosophy"},"content":{"rendered":"

Peter Anstey writes \u2026<\/em><\/p>\n

There were many critics of experimental philosophy in its early years. On this blog we have discussed the criticisms of Margaret Cavendish<\/a> and Francis Bampfield<\/a>, both of whom were English, and G. W. Leibniz<\/a>, who was German. In this post we examine the views of the French philosopher Nicolas Malebranche who was highly critical of experimental philosophy too.<\/p>\n

In the first edition of his The Search After Truth<\/em> of 1674, Malebranche devotes the last section of Book Two to \u2018Those who perform experiments\u2019, and this section appears in all six subsequent editions of the book. (See The Search After Truth<\/em>, eds T. M. Lennon and P. J. Olscamp, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp. 159\u201360.)\"\"<\/a><\/p>\n

He opens his treatment of the subject with some general comments that apply both to chemists and \u2018all those who spend their time performing experiments\u2019. Ostensibly, the criticisms are not directed at experimental philosophy per se<\/em>, but towards experimental philosophers themselves. \u2018Do not blame experimental philosophy [philosophie exp\u00e9rimentale<\/em>]\u2019, says Malebranche; it is the errors of its practitioners that he castigates.<\/p>\n

He then proceeds to list seven faults, though \u2018there are still many other defects \u2026 we do not pretend to cover them all here\u2019 (p. 160).<\/p>\n

First<\/em>, their experiments are normally directed by chance and not by reason.<\/p>\n

Second<\/em>, they are \u2018preoccupied with curious and unusual experiments\u2019 rather than beginning with the simplest and building up from there.<\/p>\n

Third<\/em>, they seek out those experiments that will bring them profit, lucriferous experiments, as Bacon would call them.<\/p>\n

Fourth<\/em>, they don\u2019t take enough care to note down \u2018all the particular circumstances\u2019 that pertain to the experiment at hand, the time of day, place, quality of the materials, etc.<\/p>\n

Fifth<\/em>, they draw too many conclusions from a single experiment, whereas it\u2019s normally the case that one conclusion can only be drawn from many experiments.<\/p>\n

Sixth<\/em>, they only consider particular effects without ascending to \u2018primary notions of things that compose bodies\u2019 (p. 159).<\/p>\n

And seventh<\/em>, they often \u2018lack courage and endurance, and give up because of fatigue or expense\u2019 (p. 160).<\/p>\n

None of these criticisms seem very serious, after all, it is easy to find exceptions to each one in the experimental practice of experimental philosophers in the 1660s and 1670s. One could hardly accuse Newton\u2019s of being directed by chance in the construction of his experimentum crucis<\/em> for establishing the heterogeneity of white light, even if his discovery of the oblong form of the spectrum of colours in his first experiment was unexpected or discovered by chance. Nor could one accuse Boyle of giving up on account of fatigue or expense in his air-pump experiments.<\/p>\n

Yet the heart of Malebranche\u2019s critique is found in the final paragraph of the section on the causes of the seven defects. He lists three causes: lack of application, misuse of the imagination, and, most importantly, judging the differences and changes among bodies only <\/em>by sensation (p. 160).<\/p>\n

This third cause is Malebranche\u2019s real reservation about, not experimental philosophers, but experimental philosophy itself: for this cause implies an over-reliance on the senses, and by implication, an under-utilisation of reason, and, in particular, reasoning from clear and distinct ideas. The whole of Book One of The Search After Truth<\/em> is given over to a discussion of the unreliability of the senses. For example, one rule of thumb that he sets out in Chapter 5 is: \u2018Never judge by means of the senses as to what things are in themselves \u2026\u2019 (p. 24).<\/p>\n

Of course, Malebranche is not averse to appealing to experiments and observations when they reinforce a point he is making (see Book I, chap. 12, pp. 56\u20137), however, the prioritising of experiment and observation above reasoning from pre-established principles and hypotheses \u2013 a central tenet of experimental philosophy \u2013 is not one of his epistemic values. Malebranche was opposed to experimental philosophy in principle<\/em>, and not merely because of the \u2018defects\u2019 of its practitioners.<\/p>\n

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Peter Anstey writes \u2026 There were many critics of experimental philosophy in its early years. On this blog we have discussed the criticisms of Margaret Cavendish and Francis Bampfield, both of whom were English, and G. W. Leibniz, who was […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":29807,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"image","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[113],"tags":[9570,16374,69930,69933,276,4402,69929,69931],"class_list":["post-4434","post","type-post","status-publish","format-image","hentry","category-ideas","tag-bampfield","tag-cavendish","tag-criticism","tag-defects","tag-experiment","tag-leibniz","tag-malebranche","tag-search-after-truth","post_format-post-format-image"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.otago.ac.nz\/emxphi\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4434","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.otago.ac.nz\/emxphi\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.otago.ac.nz\/emxphi\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.otago.ac.nz\/emxphi\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/29807"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.otago.ac.nz\/emxphi\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=4434"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.otago.ac.nz\/emxphi\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/4434\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.otago.ac.nz\/emxphi\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=4434"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.otago.ac.nz\/emxphi\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=4434"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.otago.ac.nz\/emxphi\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=4434"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}