{"id":3992,"date":"2016-02-11T09:00:36","date_gmt":"2016-02-10T21:00:36","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/blogs.otago.ac.nz\/emxphi\/?p=3992"},"modified":"2016-02-11T05:57:53","modified_gmt":"2016-02-10T17:57:53","slug":"understanding-newtons-principia-as-part-of-the-baconian-tradition","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/blogs.otago.ac.nz\/emxphi\/understanding-newtons-principia-as-part-of-the-baconian-tradition\/","title":{"rendered":"Understanding Newton\u2019s Principia as part of the Baconian Tradition"},"content":{"rendered":"

Kirsten Walsh writes…<\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n

Lately I have been examining Baconian interpretations of Newton\u2019s Principia<\/em>. First<\/a>, I demonstrated that Newton\u2019s Moon test resembles a Baconian crucial instance. And then<\/a>, I demonstrated that Newton\u2019s argument for universal gravitation resembles Bacon\u2019s method of gradual induction. This drew our attention to some interesting features of Newton\u2019s approach, bringing the Principia\u2019s <\/em>experimental aspects into sharper focus. But they also highlighted a worry: Newton\u2019s methodology resembling<\/em> Bacon\u2019s isn\u2019t enough to establish that Newton was influenced by <\/em>Bacon. Bacon and Newton were gifted methodologists\u2014they could have arrived independently at the same approach. One way to distinguish between convergence and influence is to see if there\u2019s anything uniquely <\/em>or distinctively Baconian<\/em> in Newton\u2019s use of crucial experiments and gradual induction. Another way would be if we could find some explicit references <\/em>to Bacon in relation to these methodological tools. Alas, so far, my search in these areas has produced nothing.<\/p>\n

In this post, I\u2019ll consider an alternative way of understanding Baconianism in the Principia<\/em>. I began this series by asking whether we should regard Newton\u2019s methodology as an extension of the Baconian experimental method, or as something more unique. In answering, I have hunted for evidence that the Principia<\/em> is Baconian insofar as Newton applied Baconian methodological tools in the Principia<\/em>. But you might think that whether Newton was influenced by Bacon isn\u2019t so relevant. Rather, what matters is how the Principia<\/em> was received by Newton\u2019s contemporaries. So in this post, I\u2019ll examine Mary Domski\u2019s argument<\/a> that the Principia<\/em> is part of the Baconian tradition because it was recognised, and responded to, as such by members of the Royal Society.<\/p>\n

Domski begins by dispelling the idea that there was no place for mathematics in the Baconian experimental tradition. Historically, Bacon\u2019s natural philosophical program, centred on observation, experiment and natural history<\/a>, was taken as fundamentally incompatible with a mathematical approach to natural philosophy. And Bacon is often taken to be deeply distrustful of mathematics. Domski argues, however, that Bacon\u2019s views on mathematics are both subtler and more positive. Indeed, although Bacon had misgivings about how mathematics could guide experimental practice, he gave it an important role in natural philosophy. In particular, mathematics can advance our knowledge of nature by revealing causal processes. However, he cautioned, it must be used appropriately. To avoid distorting the evidence gained via observation and experiment, one must first establish a solid foundation via natural history, and only then employ mathematical tools. In short, Bacon insisted that the mathematical treatment of nature must be grounded on, and informed by, the findings of natural history.<\/p>\n

Domski\u2019s second move is to argue that seventeenth-century Baconians such as Boyle, Sprat and Locke understood and accepted this mathematical aspect of Bacon\u2019s methodology. Bacon\u2019s influence in the seventeenth century was not limited to his method of natural history, and Baconian experimental philosophers didn\u2019t dismiss speculative approaches outright. Rather, they emphasised that there was a proper order of investigation: metaphysical and mathematical speculation must be informed by observation and experiment. In other words, there is a place for speculative philosophy after<\/em> the experimental stage has been completed.<\/p>\n

Domski then examines the reception of Newton\u2019s Principia<\/em> by members of the Royal Society\u2014focusing on Locke. For Locke, natural history was a necessary component of natural philosophy. And yet, Locke embraced the Principia <\/em>as a successful application of mathematics to natural philosophy. Domski suggests that we read Locke\u2019s Newton as a \u2018speculative naturalist\u2019 who employed mathematics in his search for natural causes. She writes:<\/p>\n

[O]n Locke\u2019s reading, Newton used a principle\u2014the fundamental truth of universal gravitation\u2014that was initially \u2018drawn from matter\u2019 and then, with evidence firmly in hand, he extended this principle to a wide store of phenomena. By staying mindful of the proper experimental and evidentiary roots of natural philosophy, Newton thus succeeded in producing the very sort of profit that Sprat and Boyle anticipated a proper \u2018speculative\u2019 method could generate (p. 165).<\/p><\/blockquote>\n

In short, Locke regarded Newton\u2019s mathematical inference as the speculative step in the Baconian program. That is, building on a solid foundation of observation and experiment, Newton was employing mathematics to reveal forces and causes.<\/p>\n

In summary, Domski makes a good case for viewing the mathematico-experimental method employed in the Principia<\/em> as part of the seventeenth-century Baconian tradition. I have a few reservations with her argument. For one thing, \u2018speculative naturalist\u2019 is surely a term that neither Locke nor Newton would have been comfortable with. And for another thing, although Domski has provided reasons to view Newton\u2019s mathematico-experimental method as related to, and a development of, the experimental philosophy of the Royal Society, I\u2019m not convinced that this shows that they viewed the Principia<\/em> as Baconian<\/em>. That is to say, there\u2019s a difference between being part of the experimental tradition founded by Bacon, and being Baconian.<\/em> I\u2019ll discuss these issues in my next post, and for now, I\u2019ll conclude by discussing some important lessons that I think arise from Domski\u2019s position.<\/p>\n

Firstly, we can identify divergences between Newton and the Baconian experimental philosophers. And these could be surprising. It\u2019s not, in itself, his use mathematics and generalisations that makes Newton different\u2014Domski has shown that even the hard-out Baconians could get on board with these features of the Principia<\/em>. The differences are subtler. For example, as I\u2019ve discussed in a previous post<\/a>, Boyle, Sprat and Locke advocated a two-stage approach to natural philosophy, in which construction of natural histories precedes theory construction. But Newton appeared to reject this two-stage approach. Indeed, in the Principia<\/em>, we find that Newton commences theory-building before his knowledge of the facts was complete<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Secondly, the account highlights the fact that early modern experimental philosophy was a work in progress. There was much variation in its practice, and room for improvement and evolution. Moreover, its modification and development was, to a large extent, the result of technological innovation and the scientific success of works like the Principia<\/em>. Indeed, it was arguably the ability to recognise and incorporate such achievements that allowed experimental philosophy to become increasingly dominant, sophisticated and successful in the eighteenth century.<\/p>\n

Thirdly, the account suggests that, already in the late-seventeenth century, the ESD framework<\/a> was being employed to guide, and also to distort, the interpretation and uptake of natural philosophy. By embracing the Principia<\/em> as their own, the early modern experimental philosophers intervened on and shaped its reception, and hence, the kind of influence the Principia <\/em>had. This raises an interesting point about influence.<\/p>\n

As I have already noted, it is difficult to establish a direct line of influence stretching from Bacon to Newton. But, by focusing on how Bacon\u2019s program for natural philosophy was developed by figures such as Boyle, Sprat and Locke, we can identify a connection between Bacon\u2019s natural philosophical program and Newton\u2019s mathematico-experimental methodology. That is, we can distinguish between influence in terms of actual causal connections\u2014Newton having read Bacon, for instance\u2014and influence insofar as some aspect of Newton’s work is taken to be related to Bacon’s by contemporary (or near-contemporary) thinkers. Indeed, Newton could have been utterly ignorant of Bacon\u2019s actual views on method, but the Principia <\/em>might nonetheless deserve to be placed alongside Bacon\u2019s work in the development of experimental philosophy. Sometimes what others take you to have done is more important than what you have actually done!<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Kirsten Walsh writes… Lately I have been examining Baconian interpretations of Newton\u2019s Principia. First, I demonstrated that Newton\u2019s Moon test resembles a Baconian crucial instance. And then, I demonstrated that Newton\u2019s argument for universal gravitation resembles Bacon\u2019s method of gradual […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":4582,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[113],"tags":[246,368,226,366,275,224,4406],"class_list":["post-3992","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-ideas","tag-bacon","tag-boyle","tag-experimental-philosophy","tag-locke","tag-mathematics","tag-newton","tag-principia"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.otago.ac.nz\/emxphi\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3992","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.otago.ac.nz\/emxphi\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.otago.ac.nz\/emxphi\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.otago.ac.nz\/emxphi\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/4582"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.otago.ac.nz\/emxphi\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=3992"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.otago.ac.nz\/emxphi\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3992\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.otago.ac.nz\/emxphi\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=3992"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.otago.ac.nz\/emxphi\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=3992"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.otago.ac.nz\/emxphi\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=3992"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}