{"id":3434,"date":"2013-11-25T18:00:56","date_gmt":"2013-11-25T06:00:56","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/blogs.otago.ac.nz\/emxphi\/?p=3434"},"modified":"2013-11-26T14:34:02","modified_gmt":"2013-11-26T02:34:02","slug":"cotes-preface-and-experiment","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/blogs.otago.ac.nz\/emxphi\/cotes-preface-and-experiment\/","title":{"rendered":"Cotes’ Preface and Experiment"},"content":{"rendered":"

Peter Anstey writes…<\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n

In my last post<\/a> I introduced Roger Cotes\u2019 famous Preface to the second edition of Newton\u2019s Principia<\/em> in order to show its importance as an expression of a commitment to experimental philosophy. In that post I focused on Cotes\u2019 critique of the Cartesian vortex theory and the manner in which this attack on the archetypal speculative philosophy formed the bookends of the Principia<\/em>. In this post I will discuss the role of experiment in Cotes\u2019 comments on experimental philosophy.<\/p>\n

The Preface is actually quite a complex essay that has both polemical and expository agendas. On the one hand, Cotes uses it to give a summary of the main theses of the Principia<\/em> centred around Newton\u2019s theory of gravity. On the other hand, Cotes uses it to defend the theory of gravity against the charge that it is an occult quality, to defend Newton\u2019s system of the world against the Cartesian vortex theory, and to defend the methodology of the work against rival approaches.<\/p>\n

On this latter point, Cotes begins by claiming that Newton\u2019s method is \u2018based upon experiment\u2019 (The <\/em>Principia, eds I.B. Cohen and A. Whitman, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999, p. 386). One might expect here that Cotes will give a list of the sorts of experimental results that Newton achieved or some reference to crucial experiments, but instead he introduces another set of methodological notions: phenomena, principles, hypotheses, analysis and synthesis. It is only later when appealing to various laws, principles and axioms in his summary of Newton\u2019s system of the world that Cotes refers to experiments.<\/p>\n

Here is a summary of Cotes\u2019 account of the method of the Principia<\/em>. Natural philosophy attempts to derive the causes of all things from the simplest of principles and not from contrived hypotheses. These principles are derived from the phenomena by a two-step process of analysis and synthesis. From select phenomena the forces and simpler laws of these forces are \u2018deduced\u2019 by analysis. Then by synthesis \u2018the constitution of the rest of the phenomena\u2019 is given. In the case of the Principia<\/em> the relevant force is gravitational attraction and the relevant law is the inverse square law. Though Cotes throws in the laws of planetary motion claiming that \u2018it is reasonable to accept something that can be found by mathematics and proved with the greatest certainty\u2019 (p. 389). He also claims, after presenting a summary of the system of the world, \u2018the preceding conclusions are based upon an axiom which is accepted by every philosopher, namely, that effects of the same kind \u2013\u2013 that is, effects whose known properties are the same \u2013\u2013 have the same causes, and their properties which are not yet known are also the same\u2019. Indeed, \u2018all philosophy is based on this rule\u2019 (p. 391).<\/p>\n

Where then do experiments fit in this picture? The first mention of experiments is in relation to the law of fall. Cotes refers here to pendulum experiments and to Boyle\u2019s air-pump. Next, Huygens\u2019 pendulum experiments are referred to in the discussion of the determination of the centripetal force of the moon towards the centre of the Earth (p. 389). They then appear in the elaboration of the \u2018same effect, same cause\u2019 axiom and its application to the attribution of gravity to all matter. Cotes says \u2018[t]he constitution of individual things can be found by observations and experiments\u2019 and from these we make universal judgments (p. 391). Thus, \u2018since all terrestrial and celestial bodies on which we can make experiments or observations are heavy, it must be acknowledged without exception that gravity belongs to all bodies universally. … extension, mobility, and impenetrability of bodies are known only through experiments\u2019 and so too is gravity. Finally, in recapping the Newtonian method near the conclusion of the Preface Cotes repeats that \u2018honest and fair judges will approve the best method of natural philosophy, which is based on experiments and observations\u2019 (p. 398).<\/p>\n

What are we to make of the role of experiments here? First, notice how experiments are appealed to in the establishment of laws and the \u2018same effect, same cause\u2019 axiom. Second, it is worth pointing out that the \u2018same effect, same cause\u2019 axiom is Newton\u2019s second rule of philosophizing: indeed, Cotes uses the very same example as Newton, namely, the falling of stones in America and Europe (see p. 795). Third, notice how without any explanation Cotes extends experiments to experiments and observations. He begins by saying that there are those \u2018whose natural philosophy is based on experiment\u2019 and he ends by saying that \u2018the best method of natural philosophy, … is based on experiments and observations\u2019. This is not an equivalent expression and while it is consistent with many other methodological statements by experimental philosophers, it still calls out for explanation.<\/p>\n

Has Cotes really given an adequate summary of the method of experimental philosophy and has he captured the manner in which experiments are used in Newton\u2019s reasoning in the Principia<\/em>? In my view he has not. I\u2019d be interested to hear your views?<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Peter Anstey writes… In my last post I introduced Roger Cotes\u2019 famous Preface to the second edition of Newton\u2019s Principia in order to show its importance as an expression of a commitment to experimental philosophy. In that post I focused […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":56,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[113],"tags":[16397,276,226,4406],"class_list":["post-3434","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-ideas","tag-cotes","tag-experiment","tag-experimental-philosophy","tag-principia"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.otago.ac.nz\/emxphi\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3434","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.otago.ac.nz\/emxphi\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.otago.ac.nz\/emxphi\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.otago.ac.nz\/emxphi\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/56"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.otago.ac.nz\/emxphi\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=3434"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.otago.ac.nz\/emxphi\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/3434\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.otago.ac.nz\/emxphi\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=3434"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.otago.ac.nz\/emxphi\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=3434"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.otago.ac.nz\/emxphi\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=3434"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}