{"id":2222,"date":"2012-04-09T20:41:55","date_gmt":"2012-04-09T08:41:55","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/blogs.otago.ac.nz\/emxphi\/?p=2222"},"modified":"2012-10-28T10:37:16","modified_gmt":"2012-10-27T22:37:16","slug":"degerando-experimental-history-philosophy","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/blogs.otago.ac.nz\/emxphi\/degerando-experimental-history-philosophy\/","title":{"rendered":"Deg\u00e9rando&#8217;s Experimental History of Philosophy"},"content":{"rendered":"<p><strong>Alberto Vanzo writes..<\/strong>.<\/p>\n<p>So far, on this blog, we have focused on a philosophical movement and a historiographical tradition. Of course, the movement was experimental philosophy. The historiographical tradition was based on the dichotomy of empiricism and rationalism and was first developed by Kantian and post-Kantian authors, like Reinhold and Tennemann, who did not belong to the movement of experimental philosophy. This post is on a historian who was an adherent of experimental philosophy and who endeavoured to employ its methodology in his history of philosophy. He is <a href=\"https:\/\/secure.wikimedia.org\/wikipedia\/en\/wiki\/Degerando\">Joseph-Marie Deg\u00e9rando<\/a>, who published a <em><a href=\"http:\/\/gallica.bnf.fr\/ark:\/12148\/bpt6k61385756\">Comparative History of the Philosophical Systems, relatively to the Principles of Human Knowledge<\/a><\/em> in 1804. Interestingly, this text is also influenced by the new post-Kantian historiography based on the rationalism-empiricism distinction.<\/p>\n<p>Deg\u00e9rando intends to apply the method of natural history to the history of philosophy. Natural histories were large structured collections of facts about natural phenomena and they were to form the basis for the identification of theories and principles. Deg\u00e9rando&#8217;s history of philosophy is a structured collection of facts about past philosophies which will help us identify which philosophical outlook is the best.<\/p>\n<p>Before starting to collect the facts, we must determine the organizing principles of the collection. Philosophers should<\/p>\n<ol>imitate naturalists, who, before entering into the vast regions of natural history, give us regular and simple nomenclatures and they seek the principle of these nomenclatures in the essential characters of each production.<\/ol>\n<p>The &#8220;nomenclatures&#8221; that form the basis for Deg\u00e9rando&#8217;s natural history of past philosophers are three dichotomies: scepticism vs dogmatism, empiricism (or sensualism) vs rational (or speculative or contemplative) philosophy; and materialism vs idealism.<\/p>\n<p>Armed with these nomenclatures, historians of philosophy should free themselves of all prejudices and collect historical facts in an unbiased way. Only after having completed this task should historians start philosophizing. Deg\u00e9rando claims to have ascertained &#8220;facts as if&#8221; he were &#8220;foreign to every opinion&#8221; and he has &#8220;later established an opinion on the basis of the sole testimony of facts&#8221;.<\/p>\n<p>In doing this, Deg\u00e9rando does not aim to write a &#8220;simple <em>narrative history<\/em>, to use Bacon&#8217;s expression&#8221;, but an &#8220;<em>inductive or comparative history<\/em> that converts the facts into &#8220;<em>experiences<\/em> in the path of human spirit.&#8221;<\/p>\n<ol>[&#8230;] the work that we set out to do can be considered as the essay of a treatise of philosophy, [&#8230;] a treatise conceived of according to the most cautious, albeit most neglected method, the method of experiences. Hence, we dare to offer this essay as <em>an essay of experimental philosophy<\/em>.<\/ol>\n<p>Deg\u00e9rando is strongly influenced by the post-Kantian historiography of Tennemann and other German historians. Like Tennemann, he focuses on epistemological issues concerning &#8220;<em>the certainty<\/em> of human cognitions&#8221;, &#8220;<em>their origin<\/em>&#8221; and <em>their reality<\/em>. Deg\u00e9rando uses the distinction between empiricism and rationalism. Like the Kantians, he criticizes them as two unilateral points of view that should be overcome by a higher philosophical standpoint. This is a form of experimental philosophy that is inspired by Bacon and Condillac and is superior to empiricism which as criticized by German historians. Empiricism stops at the facts. The philosophy of experience &#8220;transforms them&#8221; and identifies general laws.<\/p>\n<ol>Empiricism does not see anything else than the exterior of the temple of nature; experience enters into its sanctuary. Empiricism is an instinct; experience is an art. Empiricism does not see anything else than phenomena, experience ascends from effects to causes. Empiricism is confined to the present; experience learns the future from the past. Empiricism obeys blindly, experience interrogates with method. Everything is mobile, fugitive for empiricism; experience discovers regular and constant combinations underneath the variable appearances. But what need is there to insist on this distinction? He who opens [a book by] Bacon will see it standing out in every page.<\/ol>\n<p>The philosophical upshot of Deg\u00e9rando&#8217;s experimental history of philosophy<\/p>\n<ol>is spelled out by Bacon&#8217;s words, when he said in his preface to the <em>Advancement of Learning<\/em>: in this way we believe that we are combining, in a manner that is as stable as legitimate, the empirical and rational methods [&#8230;]<\/ol>\n<p>According to Deg\u00e9rando, experimental philosophy, and not Kant&#8217;s Critical philosophy is the true, higher synthesis of empiricism and rationalism.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Alberto Vanzo writes&#8230; So far, on this blog, we have focused on a philosophical movement and a historiographical tradition. Of course, the movement was experimental philosophy. The historiographical tradition was based on the dichotomy of empiricism and rationalism and was [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":4581,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[113],"tags":[229,226,475,386],"class_list":["post-2222","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-ideas","tag-empiricism","tag-experimental-philosophy","tag-french-philosophy","tag-historiography"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.otago.ac.nz\/emxphi\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2222","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.otago.ac.nz\/emxphi\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.otago.ac.nz\/emxphi\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.otago.ac.nz\/emxphi\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/4581"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.otago.ac.nz\/emxphi\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=2222"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.otago.ac.nz\/emxphi\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/2222\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/blogs.otago.ac.nz\/emxphi\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2222"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.otago.ac.nz\/emxphi\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=2222"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/blogs.otago.ac.nz\/emxphi\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=2222"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}