Recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments: Yoonwoo C & C Development v Huh [2025] NZCA 209

(By Jack Wass, Stout Street Chambers)

The Court of Appeal’s recent judgment in Yoonwoo C & C Development v Huh [2025] NZCA 209 clarified the limitation period for enforcement of foreign judgments, and in the course of its analysis made some valuable observations on the theoretical basis for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments under New Zealand law.

The proceedings were for the enforcement of a money judgment from the Republic of Korea. Because Korea is not party to any treaty-based arrangements for the enforcement of foreign judgments, the application was brought at common law. The question was whether the applicable limitation period under the Limitation Act 1950 was for actions on a contract (6 years) or actions on a “judgment” (12 years). The Court of Appeal upheld the High Court’s conclusion that the former period applied, and the latter only applied to domestic judgments.

Although the specific point at issue is unlikely to arise in many more cases (since the Limitation Act 2010 eliminated the anomalous 12-year period for domestic judgments), the Court’s reasons involve a valuable examination of the theoretical basis for recognising foreign judgments under New Zealand law.

The majority (Cooke and Collins JJ) emphasised that a judgment must be recognised before it can be enforced. It found that there were competing views in the authorities over whether proceedings taken to recognise and enforce a foreign judgment should be treated as an “action on a judgment”, but found as a matter of purposive construction that Parliament must have intended the shorter period to apply to foreign judgments. In particular, Parliament is unlikely to have intended that the period for judgments from most countries would be longer than that expressly applicable under the Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments Act 1934 for (mostly) Commonwealth judgments.

Katz J agreed in the result, but expressed separate reasons. Her Honour interpreted the case law as more clearly in favour of the shorter period, but her Honour’s reasoning was particularly influenced by the “implied obligation” theory which has been established as the basis for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in the common law since the 1870 decisions of Godard v Gray and Schibsby v Westenholz. The necessary corollary of that theory is that the limitation period for contract claims applied, which conclusion is supported by the history of the relevant legislation.

While the influence of Schibsby has been criticised (in particular by Andrew Dickinson) the doctrine of obligation is well established.  The decision is valuable for the Court’s consideration of the theoretical basis of the recognition of foreign judgments (including by extensive engagement with overseas authority and literature), and will be an instructive guide to other difficult issues in the treatment of foreign judgments for that reason.